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Summary 
Saudi Arabia was among the thirteen states elected to the UN Commission 
on the Status of Women in April of 2017. The Commission on the Status of 
Women is the leading women’s rights promoting and protecting body of the 
world, whereas the state of Saudi Arabia is infamous for conducting 
systematic discrimination towards women. The conflicting natures of a state 
were women’s rights are restricted to the extent that they are considered 
legal minors, and the main women’s rights body of the world, was naturally 
remarkable. The Commission on the Status of Women works towards 
improving the lives of women globally, most importantly by creating treaty 
law and encouraging states to commit to realizing women’s human rights. 
One significant challenge to the global promotion of women’s rights is the 
notion of cultural relativism. Rather than striving for universalism, cultural 
relativists risk excluding certain women from international women’s rights 
based on their cultural context. The main international legal document 
concerning women’s rights is the Convention on the Elimination of All 
forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) from 1979. Saudi 
Arabia ratified CEDAW in 2000, with the reservation that Shari’ah is to be 
favoured in the case of conflict between CEDAW and Islamic norms. Saudi 
Arabia is a wealthy oil country with a fascinating history, where the royal 
Saud family also practically constitutes the government. Since 2016, and 
particularly since the appointment in 2017, Saudi Arabia has made 
remarkable positive changes towards the promotion of women’s rights, e.g. 
lifting the ban on women driving. Saudi Arabia’s presence on the CSW 
might have a negative international impact due to the state’s strong 
economy and political influence. However, Saudi Arabia has a strong focus 
on boosting the economy for the future, where the dependence on oil will 
need to decrease. The economic incitements to promote women’s rights 
within the CSW as well as on the domestic level, e.g. more women working, 
are significant. Therefore, optimistically, the possible negative impact of the 
appointment will become outweighed by the possible positive impact.  
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Sammanfattning 
Saudiarabien var bland de tretton stater som i april 2017 blev invalda till 
FN:s Kvinnokommission. Kvinnokommissionen utgör världens viktigaste 
politiska organ när det kommer till beskyddandet och främjandet av 
kvinnors rättigheter. Samtidigt är Saudiarabien en stat ökänd för sin 
systematiska diskriminering av kvinnor. Kontrasten mellan ett land där 
kvinnors rättigheter är kraftigt begränsade, inte minst genom förmynderi, 
och världens främsta organ för främjandet av kvinnors mänskliga 
rättigheter, var naturligtvis anmärkningsvärd. Kvinnokommissionen arbetar 
för ett globalt förbättrande av kvinnors liv, främst genom att formulera och 
verka för genomdrivandet av internationella fördrag och uppmuntra stater 
att förverkliga kvinnors rättigheter. Ett särskilt hinder för främjandet av 
kvinnors globala rättigheter är kulturrelativism. Istället för att sträva efter att 
alla världens kvinnor ska skyddas av samma internationella rätt, menar 
kulturrelativister att hänsyn ska tas till kulturellt sammanhang. 
Kvinnokonventionen från 1979 utgör världens främsta internationella 
rättsliga dokument rörande kvinnors rättigheter. Saudiarabien ratificerade 
Kvinnokonventionen år 2000 med reservation för att Islamisk rätt ska ges 
företräde över Kvinnokommissionen om konflikt skulle uppstå dem mellan. 
Saudiarabien är en förmögen oljestat med en spännande historia och ett 
statsskick där kungafamiljen Saud i praktiken även utgör regeringen. Sedan 
2016, och särskilt sedan tillsättningen 2017, har Saudiarabien genomfört 
uppseendeväckande positiva förändringar för kvinnors rättigheter, ex. 
borttagandet av förbudet för kvinnor att köra bil. Det finns en risk att 
Saudiarabien, med anledning av sin starka ekonomi och politiska inflytande, 
kommer att påverka Kvinnokommissionen negativt. Samtidigt fokuserar 
landet på att säkra sin starka ekonomi även i en kommande framtid med ett 
Saudiarabien mindre beroende av oljan. Åtgärder som främjar kvinnors 
rättigheter, såsom minskade hinder att arbeta, bidrar också positivt till 
landets ekonomi. Förhoppningsvis kommer därför de eventuellt negativa 
effekterna från tillsättningen överträffas av de eventuellt positiva effekterna.  
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Abbreviations 
BDPfA  Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action 
CAT  Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
  Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
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HRC  Human Rights Council  
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  Rights  
UDHR  Universal Declaration of Human Rights  
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1 Introduction  
“Electing Saudi Arabia to protect women’s rights is like  
making an arsonist into the town fire chief.” 
- Hillel Neuer, Executive Director of UN Watch 
 
1.1 Background  
In April 2017, the 54 member states of the UN Economic and Social 
Council, ECOSOC, by secret ballot elected Saudi Arabia and twelve other 
states to the UN Commission on the Status of Women, CSW, for the period 
of 2018-2022. The CSW is the main women’s rights protecting body in the 
world, while Saudi Arabia is a state known and criticized for systematically 
discriminating towards women. Saudi Arabia ranked 141 out of 144 in the 
World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report 2016 and was in place 
138 in this year’s report.1 The clash between a country where women are 
legal minors throughout their entire lives, and the world’s main body for 
empowering women and promoting gender rights, caused the media to 
produce a large amount of articles addressing the appointment. The 47 votes 
in favour, while being enough for Saudi Arabia to be appointed, was the 
lowest among all of these thirteen new member states. The people of the 
states who might have voted in favour of Saudi Arabia demanded to know 
how their state representatives had voted and questioned their governments. 
Refusal by world leaders to reveal their vote, all the while referring to the 
secrecy of the ballot, was considered as indication of a vote in favour. The 
government of Sweden, that claims to exercise a feminist foreign policy, 
refused to reveal their vote. The prime minister of Belgium however, did 
admit the representative of Belgium had voted in favour of Saudi Arabia 
and issued an apology for this, saying he would change the vote if he could.  
                                                 
1 World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report 2016 and 2017, both available at 
https://www.weforum.org/reports.  
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 The general outrage from the media and human rights 
organizations was naturally based on the contradiction of having one of the 
worst oppressors of women’s rights on the UN body guarding women’s 
rights. This might reflect a view that the appointment of Saudi Arabia could 
actually damage the progress for women’s rights being made through the 
work of the Commission, simultaneously meaning the work of the CSW is 
indeed important and effective. It could also reflect the view that UN human 
rights bodies are exclusive groups into which membership is to be granted 
when states have reached a certain level on the spectrum of ensuring human 
rights. With that view, the appointment of Saudi Arabia merely proves all 
international legal bodies to be acts of charade and not in reality rights 
promoting at all. What we do know, however, is that human rights violators 
are indeed on the Human Rights Council (HRC) and states having ratified 
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT) still conduct torture. This means the idea 
that ideal behaviour should finally grant you a place on UN human rights 
bodies, does not reflect reality.  
 Saudi Arabia is a fascinating country with a complex history 
and a rather unique constellation of government. The Saud royal family is 
represented in all layers of the government. The state of Saudi Arabia is 
founded on one powerful family in particular, its history intertwined with a 
specific part of Islam aimed at keeping the people to the purest of paths to 
the religion. The entire foundation of the Saudi state has its roots in 
Wahhabism, which to this day is the framework of all legislation and social 
conduct. Women’s rights in Saudi Arabia are very limited, with the male 
guardianship system constituting the most significant barrier. The idea of 
women’s rights as universal, and the idea of women’s rights as dependent 
on cultural context, are not easy to combine. While the legal framework of 
the UN to protect women’s rights presupposes women as individuals, the 
Saudi view on the protection of women’s rights is within the context of 
family. The clash arises between the idea of someone having a right because 
they are human, and of someone having a right because they are part of a 
religious or social group. One fundamental aspect of Western international 
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women’s rights is that they are human rights, e.g. the same as men’s rights. 
Within the Islamic law practiced in Saudi Arabia, women’s rights do not 
necessarily have to be the same rights as those of men. Because the history 
of the UN and international human rights legal documents stems from a 
Western tradition and point of view, part of the controversy with the 
appointment of Saudi Arabia has to do with Western and non-Western legal 
traditions and values coming together. The view on human rights 
particularly varies throughout the world, because of aspects such as the 
individual vs the collective, the individual vs the family, and protection 
being focused on the rights of the individual vs on the right to privacy of the 
family.  
 Conversations on women’s rights in different parts of the 
world often turns into discussions on the subject of culture. Cultural 
relativists claims the problem with the international legal framework for 
women’s rights is that it is a Western framework, and that the ambition to 
bring all women everywhere to the same minimum global standard level of 
human rights means disregarding the diversity of the world and 
undermining the authority of any state different from the Western. These are 
of course highly complicated and delicate matters. However, the reasons 
Saudi Arabia is falling short of offering female inhabitants even nearly the 
same rights as male ones, are seemingly found in the country’s choice of 
combining religion with governance. Speaking of culture when the 
conversation should be on the subject of religion is, it seems, a common 
phenomenon. However difficult the notion of culture is to define and limit, 
it can be said that in the case of Saudi Arabia, it is within the culture to base 
its laws on Islam. While ratifying the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 2000 and by that 
acknowledging the treaty as effective law in the state, Saudi Arabia made 
strong reservations that makes Islamic law superordinate to CEDAW to the 
Saudi state. Within the Western, and therefore Christian, legal tradition, 
religious values have been indirectly included in legal norms over a long 
period of time. In Saudi Arabia, Islamic law is instead used as a source of 
legal norms in itself, not reformed into domestic legislation but directly 
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turned into modern laws. This unique aspect adds to the diversion between 
the UN’s Western secular view on law and the Saudi Arabian view on 
religion and law as being inseparable things.  
 Considering the possible impact the appointment of Saudi 
Arabia can have on the CSW, Hillel Neuer has said it is not clear what 
“concrete impact” the appointment of Saudi Arabia will have in the near 
future, considering the broad mandate of the Commission.2 In another 
interview, Neuer said: “Sadly, the United Nations does not follow its own 
principles. For example the Human Rights Council, countries are supposed 
to be elected according to their record on human rights. The reality we 
know, we’ve found access to Saudi documents that were published by 
Wikileaks, where the Saudi ambassador wrote a letter to the Russian 
ambassador saying ‘Let’s make a reciprocal agreement of support’.”3 This 
issue of trading votes has also been pointed out in relation to the UK.4 Neuer 
went on to say that “petrol dollars are trumping principles and are trumping 
human rights” and that while the CSW “doesn’t necessarily have an 
immediate impact”, the UN by electing Saudi Arabia to the CSW sent a 
message to Saudi women in particular and that Saudi women activist 
considered the UN to have “betrayed (them) by putting their oppressor in a 
position of power and influence when it comes to women’s rights”.  
 UN Women has a clear economic focus, where female 
participation in society and the economic growth of society are two positive 
sides to the promotion of women’s rights. Over the months that have passed 
since the election, several positive changes have been made in Saudi Arabia 
to promote women’s rights. The driving ban being lifted from June 2018 is 
presumably the most important one, but the Crown Prince Mohammad bin 
Salman has made other changes as well towards money generating social 
activities that will mean the inclusion of women, e.g. the re-opening of 
                                                 
2 Zillman, Claire,’It’s absurd’: How Saudi Arabia ended up on the UN Women’s Rights 
Commission, 25 April 2017, available at http://fortune.com/2017/04/25/un-womens-rights-
saudi-arabia/, visited on 2017-12-05. 
3 Interview with Hillel Neuer for i24 News, available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ua-gxBApc-k, visited on 2017-11-05. 
4 Whitaker, Brian, UN chooses Saudi Arabia to champion women’s rights, 24 April 2017, 
available at http://al-bab.com/blog/2017/04/un-chooses-saudi-arabia-champion-womens-
rights.  
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cinemas and allowing women to attend sports events. The economic aspect 
of women’s rights is undeniable, particularly in the future non-oil era of 
Saudi Arabia. 
 
1.2 Purpose  
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate what the effects of the appointment 
of Saudi Arabia to the CSW might be over the period of 2018-2022, on the 
international level, i.e. the CSW and women’s global rights and on the 
national level, i.e. Saudi women’s rights. Producing this paper prior to the 
mandate period of 2018-2022, it could provide a base of information that 
might enable a wider perspective on this issue than the one solely focusing 
on the possible negative effects.  
 
1.3 Research questions 
 What international impact will the appointment of Saudi Arabia to 
the Commission on the Status of Women for 2018-2022 have, on the 
Commission and on women’s global rights? 
 What domestic impact will the appointment of Saudi Arabia to the 
Commission on the Status of Women for 2018-2022 have on the 
rights of Saudi women?  
 
1.4  Method, material and theory  
Considering the novelty of this paper topic, the election having occurred 
less than a year ago, the material dealing with this particular situation is 
sparse. In order to answer my research questions, I have instead used the 
material available on the subjects of international gender rights, the nation 
of Saudi Arabia, the Commission on the Status of Women and culture and 
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religion separately, after which I have tried to find conclusions to be drawn 
that are relevant to the issue of the appointment. This topic needs to be 
approached with a sense of care, since it so easily becomes polarised and 
derailed from the issues at hand. My point of view has been that naturally 
there are no easy answers because these are not easy questions. Approaching 
this topic in the first place, the aim was to collect as many different angles 
to the problem as possible. In order to create a fair starting point, with as 
few poorly nuanced positions as possible on each particular topic, I have 
aimed at reaching to their core by searching for well-founded material, 
reflective of more than one point of view, both by Western and non-Western 
writers.  
 Because international law in itself, not at least women’s rights, 
is highly political and because the Commission in itself is a political body, it 
has been impossible as well as undesirable to avoid politics in this paper. It 
is also a paper on religion’s influence on law, and the ambiguous notion of 
culture, which has lead me to use not only legal sources but also 
sociological and anthropological material. Since the focus of my research 
has been on the impact of women, and the clash between culture and 
women, the West and the non-West, I have brought in some aspects from 
the feminist and postcolonial theories and the legal cultural theory. In order 
to achieve as much terminological accuracy as possible, I have used the 
Arabic spelling of certain words rather than the English, e.g. Shari’ah.  
 
1.5 Limitations  
Due to the scope of the paper and my ambition to go into some depth, I have 
had to make certain limitations. This includes not going too much into detail 
as to what countries voted in favour of Saudi Arabia, or why, considering 
that speculation about situations of trading votes with economic motives 
goes beyond my intention with this paper and does not contribute to my 
research questions. Saudi Arabia has been elected to the CSW, and so I will 
instead look into what has happened since and what might happen in the 
near future. Concerning the issue of gender rights and Islamic law, I have 
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limited this part of my paper to consider the specific Saudi situation and not 
gender and Islam as a whole, since that is too broad and complex and, again, 
does not contribute to answering my research questions. Nor will I 
generalize this particular topic to being about women’s rights in Muslim 
Arab countries vs in the West. My paper is on Saudi Arabia and this state’s 
own take on religion, gender and human rights, in relation to the CSW.   
 
1.6 Literature review  
The topic of Saudi Arabia in the CSW is new and there has not yet been 
anything scientifically written about it. There are many articles from general 
media and a few blog posts. The research on the CSW, Saudi Arabia, gender 
rights, religion and culture separately is of course extensive.  
 
1.7 Disposition  
Following this introductory chapter, the legal and theoretical framework 
will be set out in chapter 2. Chapter 3 goes more into detail on the 
Commission on the Status of Women, followed by a case study on Saudi 
Arabia in chapter 4. Next, chapter 5 constitutes the paper’s analysis and 
lastly there is a brief conclusion in chapter 6.  
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2 Women’s rights in 
international law  
2.1 Introduction  
To evaluate what different forms of impact there might be from the election 
of Saudi Arabia onto the UN Commission on the Status of Women, it is 
necessary first to set out the legal framework. The CSW works towards 
promoting women’s human rights globally and exists within, as well as is 
part in creating, the international legal framework concerning women’s 
rights. To understand the role of the CSW it is important first to have an 
overview of the legal context surrounding it. This chapter aims to give an 
overview of the relevant historical background to women’s rights and of the 
legal instruments, as well as a basic understanding of certain challenges 
there might be to the promotion of women’s rights. 
 
2.2 History of women’s human rights  
The history of women’s rights is a part of the still relatively young history 
of human rights. The rights of women have only quite recently become 
generally perceived simply as human rights within the international law 
framework. The following describes the main milestones relevant in 
international law from the 1940’s leading up to the legal framework of 
women’s rights as of today, starting with a brief overview of the 
categorisation of women’s rights.  
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2.2.1 Categorisation of rights  
When categorising the rights of women, the legislator sends a message 
about what women, and their rights, should be in society. 5 There are three 
main categories of rights.  
 
2.2.1.1 Protective rights 
Protective rights, specifically for women, assume the position that women, 
because of their physical disadvantage, inevitably need protecting and that 
they, together with the law, need to accept this fact and behave accordingly.6 
Implying that women are a subordinate group, these provisions apply only 
to women. An example of such a protective right is the limitation of night 
work for women in the ILO’s Convention Concerning Night Work of 
Women Employed in Industry. This sort of legislation is, while 
acknowledging the possible differences between women and men, at risk at 
cementing a self-fulfilling myth of belittling women.7 
 
2.2.1.2 Corrective rights  
Corrective rights, as do protective rights, identify women as a group.8 As 
opposed to the exclusionary character of protective rights, corrective rights 
want to include women by “removing a previous bar to activity”9. They aim 
to achieve an alteration in society, an improvement of the lives of women, 
“without making overt comparisons to the situation of men”10. Examples of 
rights of this type is trafficking conventions.11  
 
                                                 
5 Kaufman Hevener, Natalie, An Analysis of Gender Based Treaty Law: Contemporary 
Developments in Historical Perspective, pp. 70-88, Human Rights Quarterly vol. 8, no. 1, 
Feb. 1986, p. 71.  
6 Ibid. 
7 Charlesworth, Hilary C. & Chinkin, Christine, The Boundaries of International Law: A 
Feminist Analysis, Melland Schill Studies in International Law, Juris Publishing, New 
York, Manchester University Press, Manchester 2000, p. 213. 
8 Kaufman Hevener 1986, p. 72. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Charlesworth & Chinkin 2000, p. 213. 
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2.2.1.3 Non-discriminatory rights 
Non-discriminatory provisions rejects the idea of women as a separate 
group and so they apply to men as well as to women.12 These sex-neutral 
rights aim to achieve equal treatment between the genders, and end both 
discrimination and special treatment towards women. The overwhelmingly 
non-discriminatory character of most of CEDAW’s provisions is reflected 
by the goal of achieving gender equality.13  
 Next is an overview of the history of women’s rights leading 
up to CEDAW and other important legal documents.  
 
2.2.2 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
The history of women’s rights derive from the history of the rights of men, 
in the sense of males, not humans. This is an important aspect to keep in 
mind when studying women’s rights evolution over the twentieth century. 
 Human rights were recognized after the Second World War, 
with the creation of the United Nations and its Charter14. The Preamble to 
the Charter of the United Nations, signed in 1945, refers to “the equal rights 
of men and women”. In Article 1 (3), sex is listed as a discrimination 
ground. The Commission on the Status of Women was established in 1946 
and will be referred to later on in this chapter and further detailed in the next 
chapter. The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was 
adopted by the General Assembly in 1948. In its Article 2, it states sex as 
one of the grounds upon discrimination from the Declaration is not 
permitted. UDHR was created as a gender-neutral text that was “innovative 
and even radical because women in many UN Member States, still, lacked 
basic civil and political rights”15. However, only including women through 
choice of wording and as a discrimination category, proved not to be enough 
to promote women’s rights.16 
                                                 
12 Kaufman Hevener 1986, p. 72. 
13 Ibid, p. 79. 
14 United Nations Charter. 59 Stat. 1031; TS 993. Entered into force 24 October 1945. 
15 Kouvo, Sari, Making Just Rights? Mainstreaming Women’s Human Rights and a Gender 
Perspective, Iustus Förlag, Uppsala 2004, p. 97. 
16 Kuovo 2004, p. 97.  
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2.2.3 DEDAW 
The UN Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 
DEDAW17, was adopted by the General Assembly in 1967, after having 
been presented by the CSW. The differentiation compared to the UDHR 
was that it particularly pointed to the specific discrimination towards 
women. Article 1 states that “[d]iscrimination against women, denying or 
limiting as it does their equality of rights with men, is fundamentally unjust 
and constitutes an offence against human dignity.” In being a declaration, 
however, this legal document did not mean anything in terms of binding the 
Member States but rather worked as a statement of intent. Something more 
was still needed to try to promote women’s rights in international law.  
 
2.2.4 CEDAW 
The main global legal document on women’s rights is the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, CEDAW. 
 
2.2.4.1 Brief history 
The CSW started working towards a convention in 1974 and requested that 
the Secretary-General encourage the governments of UN Member States, 
non-governmental organisations and “specialized agencies” to provide their 
opinions.18 In 1979, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women was adopted by the General Assembly. 
UDHR being the “international bill of rights”, CEDAW was to be the 
“international bill of women’s rights”. Article 1 states that “discrimination 
against women” means “any disctinciton, exclusion or restriction made on 
the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying 
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their 
marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil 
                                                 
17 A/RES/22/2263, Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (7 
November 1967).  
18 Kuovo 2004, p. 107.  
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or any other field”. Something that particularly sets CEDAW apart from 
other international law treaties, is its take on the public vs the private.19 
Comparing Article 16 of CEDAW to the same article in the UDHR, the 
view on family and individualism is different. According to the former, 
“[s]tate Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family 
relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and 
women”. The latter formulates that “[t]he family is the neutral and 
fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society 
and the State.” However, simply setting out the way to promote gender 
rights as putting a stop to discrimination, CEDAW ignored the root of the 
discrimination problem: the inferior level of economic, social and political 
power both privately and publicly.20 Discrimination can, and should be, 
considered a symptom of a patriarchal society, not as the very problem that 
upholds it.  
 
2.2.4.2 The CEDAW Committee  
In 1982, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women was established in order to form an expert body to watch over the 
implementation of CEDAW. CEDAW states the main way of doing this is 
considering State reports. Any further means of supervising are not included 
for the Committee. The form and functions of the Committee are found in 
CEDAW Part V Articles 17-22. Article 21 (1) states that the Committee 
“shall, through the Economic and Social Council, report annually to the 
General Assembly of the United Nations on its activities and may make 
suggestions and general recommendations based on the examination of 
reports and information received from the States Parties”. Reports are then 
to be transmitted to the CSW for its information. This procedure enables the 
CSW to identify patterns of discrimination and to make proposals of 
                                                 
19 Charlesworth & Chinkin 2000, p. 217.  
20 Ibid, p. 229.  
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change.21 The Committee’s members are nominated and elected, by secret 
ballot, by State Parties to CEDAW. These members should, according to 
Article 17 (1) be “twenty-three experts of high moral standing and 
competence in the field covered by the Convention”. Consideration is also 
to be given to “the representation of the different forms of civilization as 
well as the principal legal systems”. The members serve four-year terms and 
have been mostly female.22 Despite the demand members be independent, 
not representing or following instructions of their governments, there have 
been members to the Committee who are also in the government.23 
 In 1997, a process of preparing General Recommendations 
was outlined.24 This would consist of a general discussion during an open 
meeting, turning into a draft general recommendation, which would then be 
discussed in the working group, leading to a revised draft that could then be 
adopted by the Committee. As of last year, 2016, the Committee had 
adopted 34 general recommendations.  
 
2.2.4.3 Reservations to CEDAW 
Of all the UN human rights treaties, CEDAW is one of the most ratified.25 
Unfortunately, it also has the greatest number of reservations. CEDAW is 
open to reservations in order to encourage its ratification, meaning that 
states can tailor the convention to its particular needs. However, this “you 
can lead a horse to water but you cannot make it drink” sort of reasoning, 
might lead states away from the universal character of women’s human 
rights.26 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states in its Article 
19 (c) that reservations must not be “incompatible with the object and 
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purpose of the treaty”. The same is pointed out in CEDAW Article 28 (2). 
In the case of states with strong reservations on the grounds of Islamic law, 
the Committee has tried to highlight examples of the Muslim countries that 
have ratified CEDAW with less, or even no, reservations.27 However, 
concerned with the number of reservations made to CEDAW, the 
Committee in 1987, through a General Recommendation to the UN, 
proposed that the status of women under Islamic laws be studied in order for 
the Committee to properly supervise implementation.28 This was met with 
accusations of “cultural imperialism”, “attacks on Islam” and the 
recommendation was not accepted. A little over a decade later, Saudi Arabia 
would ratify CEDAW with reservations that would favour Islamic law.  
 
2.2.4.3.1 Reservations made by Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia ratified CEDAW on 7 September 2000 with the following 
general reservations:  
 
“1. In case of contradiction between any term of the Convention and the 
norms of Islamic law, the Kingdom is not under obligation to observe the 
contradictory terms of the Convention. 
2. The Kingdom does not consider itself bound by paragraph 2 of article 9 
of the Convention and paragraph 1 of article 29 of the Convention.”29 
 
Article 9 (2) states: “State Parties shall grant women equal rights with men 
with respect to the nationality of their children.” Article 29 (1) states: “Any 
dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or 
application of the present Convention which is not settled by negotiation 
shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six 
                                                 
27 Byrnes 2013, p. 57. 
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months from the date of the request for arbitration the parties are unable to 
agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those parties may 
refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in 
conformity with the Statute of the Court.” 
 
A number of states (Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom) had objections to these reservations.  
 The second reservation was found to be incompatible with the 
object and purpose of CEDAW by Austria, Finland, France, Netherlands, 
Norway and Spain. Denmark, Germany, Ireland and Portugal objected on 
the basis that this reservation was contrary to the essence of CEDAW. 
 Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain and the United Kingdom objected to the first reservation by pointing 
out that it had an unclear, unlimited scope as to what provisions it would 
apply to and to what extent. . “Furthermore…” Finland stated, 
“…reservations are subject to the general principle of treaty interpretation 
according to which a party may not invoke the provisions of its domestic 
law as justification for a failure to perform its treaty obligations.”30 France 
voiced a fear for this reservation leading to all of the provisions of CEDAW 
becoming completely ineffective. Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden 
objected to the first reservation, raising doubts as to Saudi Arabia’s 
commitment to CEDAW. The Netherlands also feared the reservation might 
contribute to the undermining of the basis of international treaty law as a 
whole.  
 In the majority of Muslim states, legal discrimination towards 
women is limited to the family sphere, whereas in Saudi Arabia the 
discrimination cover most public spheres as well, e.g. education, 
employment and general societal participation.31 This means that 
reservations made on the basis of avoiding conflicts with Saudi Arabia’s 
                                                 
30 8 October 2002.  
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Islamic law affects Saudi women more than a similar reservation would 
affect women of any other Muslim state. There are reasons to agree with the 
point of view that “[r]ather than ratify with reservations that effectively 
nullify its obligations under the treaty, a state should elect not to become 
party to a treaty in the first place.”32 
 
2.2.4.4 Implementation of CEDAW 
Enforcement is a main issue of any part of international law. One suggested 
weak point, affecting the particular implementation force of the CSW, is its 
relatively weak language compared to other conventions and the magnitude 
of reservations.33 For example, where states are obliged to take “all 
appropriate measures”, it leaves a lot of interpreting up to them as to what 
that extends to.34 Another problem is the lack of sufficient means of 
monitoring compliance within CEDAW, consisting only of Article 18, 
which states that “[s]tate Parties undertake to submit to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, for consideration by the Committee, a report 
on the legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures which they 
have adopted to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention and 
on the progress made in this respect: (a) Within one year after the entry into 
force for the State concerned; (b) Thereafter at least every four years and 
further whenever the Committee so requests.”  
 
2.2.5 The Vienna Conference  
In 1993, the Second World Conference on Human Rights was held in 
Vienna, ending with the adoption of the Vienna Declaration and Programme 
of Action35. This was an important event in the history of women’s rights 
because of its focus on women’s rights as human rights and the universality 
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of women’s rights. Women from grassroots organizations, human rights 
activists and women in government joint together in order to share 
information and discuss strategies.36 
 
2.2.5.1 Women’s rights are human rights 
The view on women’s rights in the Vienna Programme is mainly focused on 
the implementation of women’s human rights, for example in part I para 18 
which states that “[t]he human rights of women and of the girl-child are an 
inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal human rights. The full 
and equal participation of women in political, civil, economic, social and 
cultural life, at the national, regional and international levels, and the 
eradication of all forms of discrimination on grounds of sex are priority 
objectives of the international community. […] The human rights of women 
should form an integral part of the United Nations human rights activities, 
including the promotion of all human rights instruments relating to women. 
The World Conference on Human Rights urges Governments, institutions, 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to intensify their 
efforts for the protection and promotion of human rights of women and the 
girl-child.” Moving away from viewing women’s rights as a sub-group to 
men’s human rights, the Vienna Programme re-enforced the notion of 
women’s rights being human rights.  
 
2.2.5.2 Universality of rights  
The universality of human rights was stated in in the Vienna Programme 
part I para 5: “All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent 
and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights 
globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same 
emphasis. While the significance of national and regional particularities and 
various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in 
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mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and 
cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.” However, at the conference the Saudi foreign minister, while 
admitting the principles and objectives of human rights are of a universal 
nature, pointed out the necessity of a considerate application of these rights 
as to historical, cultural, religious and legal diversity among societies.37  
 The Vienna Programme later goes on to state, in part II para 
37, that “[t]he equal status of women and the human rights of women should 
be integrated into the mainstream of United Nations system-wide activity.” 
The process of mainstreaming women’s rights was further embraced at the 
Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995.   
 
2.2.6 The Beijing Declaration and Platform for 
Action 
The Fourth World Conference on Women was held in Beijing in 1995, 
resulting in adoption of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, 
BDPfA38.  
 
2.2.6.1 Gender mainstreaming 
BDPfA speaks of “mainstreaming” in order to promote equality, for 
example in para 221, which states that “[t]he human rights of all women and 
the girl child must form an integral part of United Nations human rights 
activities. Intensified efforts are needed to integrate the equal status and the 
human rights of all women and girls into the mainstream of United Nations 
system-wide activities and to address these issues regularly and 
systematically throughout relevant bodies and mechanisms.” Para 229 states 
that “[i]n addressing the enjoyment of human rights, Governments and other 
actors should promote an active and visible policy of mainstreaming a 
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gender perspective in all policies and programmes so that, before decisions 
are taken, an analysis is made of the effects on women and men, 
respectively.” This way of integrating the gender perspective “requires 
countries to investigate the underlying bases of women’s subordination, 
public, private, structural, or systematic.”39  
 The term “gender mainstreaming” was defined in 1997 by the 
Economic and Social Council, ECOSOC, as “the process of assessing the 
implications for women and men of any planned action, including 
legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a 
strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an 
integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and 
societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not 
perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.”40 Rather than 
separate actions targeting women specifically, gender mainstreaming is built 
on the theory of the structural inequality can only be rattled through 
centralization of these actions.41 However, a declaration is still soft law and 
recommends rather than binds states, and lacks any remedies hard law has 
when being breached – on the other hand, soft law is “much easier to 
negotiate” than hard law.42 According to Charlesworth “[t]he documents are 
so long (…), windy, repetitive, ambiguous, and contradictory that they are 
quite daunting and give little practical guidance on implementation.”43 
CEDAW is what legally mandates the process of mainstreaming within 
countries, which is the only way it will reach full effect.44 Governments are 
urged to “[r]atify and accede to and ensure implementation of the 
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Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women so that universal ratification of the Convention can be achieved by 
the year 2000”, according to the BDPfA Chapter IV I para. 230 (b), i.e. 
discouraging reservations.  
 The BDPfA provided a sort of catalyst function towards a 
milestone in the women’s rights system – a complaints procedure for 
breaches of the CEDAW.45 This had been preceded by the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action, part II para 40, and would lead to the 
creation of the Optional Protocol to CEDAW.  
 
2.2.7 The Optional Protocol 
A draft ‘Optional Protocol’ was made by independent experts to the 
Committee in Maastricht in 1994.46 After the draft had been debated and 
developed by a Commission working group for four years the Optional 
Protocol to CEDAW was sent to ECOSOC, debated in the General 
Assembly and was finally adopted in 1999.47 Article 2 of the Optional 
Protocol gives the Committee mandate to hear complaints from “individuals 
or groups of individuals, under the jurisdiction of the State Party, claiming 
to be victims of a violation of any of the rights set forth in the Convention 
by that State Party.” However, the draft was broader and included not only 
individuals, groups or organisations affected by a violation but also 
individuals, groups or organisations “with a sufficient interest”, which 
would have targeted discrimination on a systematic level as well as the 
individual level.48 Instead of states being obliged to sort out the violation, 
the final text settled on the following being formulated in Article 7 (4): “The 
State Party shall give due consideration to the views of the Committee, 
together with its recommendations, if any, and shall submit to the 
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Committee, within six months, a written response, including information on 
any action taken in the light of the views and recommendations of the 
Committee.” The Optional Protocol “strengthens national mechanisms for 
ensuring women’s full enjoyment of their rights by providing a path to relief 
for individual grievances and by improving understanding of the obligations 
imposed by the convention”49. The Optional Protocol does allow the 
Committee to inquire without a specific complaint, as stated in Article 8 (1). 
Moreover, according to Article 9, the State may be invited to (1) include in 
the national report any measures taken to an Article 8 inquiry and/or (2) 
inform the Committee of measures taken, if the State exceeds the time frame 
of six months set out in Article 8 (4). This, however, is subject to the 
possibility for states of “opting out” by declaring it does not recognize the 
competence of the Committee provided for in articles 8 and 9, formulated in 
Article 10. Saudi Arabia has not ratified the Optional Protocol.  
 
2.3 Promotion of women’s rights in 
international law 
Apart from the actual enforcement of international law, human rights bodies 
work towards the general promotion of human rights in different ways. In 
relation to the question of how women’s international and national rights 
might be affected by the appointment of Saudi Arabia, the following is a 
brief overview of the ways of promotion of women’s rights.  
 
2.3.1 The CSW 
The CSW, being the leading global women’s rights political body, works 
towards promoting women’s rights in different ways, both within itself and 
in relation to outside actors.  
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2.3.1.1 Multi-Year Programmes of Work  
Since 1987, the CSW has created Multi-Year Programmes of Work, 
“containing priority themes for discussion and action at its annual 
sessions”50. Starting 2006 there is also an annual review theme, in order to 
evaluate implementation of conclusions agreed upon from previous 
sessions. The priority theme for 2017 is “Women’s economic empowerment 
in the changing world of work”. These programmes set out the over-arching 
goals of the CSW in working to promote women’s rights in reality.  
 
2.3.1.2 NGO participation  
International level women’s rights advocacy is only effective when based on 
the real experiences of women and reflect the struggles of local and national 
women’s rights organizations.51 The actual, practical, real-life promotion of 
women’s rights is, again, due to implementation, which is the crucial aspect 
of all international human rights law. Because the legal framework and 
policy framework of women’s rights are without sanctions, holding national 
leaders accountable for the commitments they have made is an important 
effort of NGOs. The majority of the “real gains” in the promotion of 
women’s lives are indeed due to grassroots work.52 NGOs therefore play an 
important role towards furthering the work of the CSW. Together with the 
CSW and the CEDAW Committee, NGOs create the foundation to the 
promotion of women’s rights.  
 There are many challenges to the promotion of women’s 
rights, some of which are particularly relevant in relation to the appointment 
of Saudi Arabia to the CSW.   
 
2.3.2 Challenges to promoting women’ rights 
The core of global women’s rights is that they are supposed to be universal, 
protective of all women of the world. However, this very universality is 
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mirrored in the notion of cultural sensitivity, meaning the promotion of 
women’s rights need to be adapted to the cultural surroundings of women. 
The term “culture” seems to have a variety of meanings and relate to 
different societal issues depending on the context at hand. One way of 
looking at culture, is that it only exists until education replaces it.53 Because 
the implementation of human rights cannot be forced but rather gently 
pushed upon states, it is the culture of rights in the receiving states that is 
changed.54 Culturalism in itself can initiate traditionalism, which can lead to 
the regression of human rights.55 Women is the one group in society that has 
had its human rights most gravely violated in the name of culture, largely 
because the historical identification of women as belonging to the “private” 
sphere has kept them away from the public.56  
 
2.3.2.1 Cultural relativism  
For the past thirty years, the idea of cultural relativism has been strongly 
present in the context of international relations, perhaps because of liberal 
cultural sensitivity along with the feeling of civilisations clashing.57 
Whatever the reasons might be, “appeals to cultural relativism have grown 
in intensity and frequency as the scope of the international human rights 
regime grows wider.”58 Cultural relativism means that particular cultural 
norms take charge over the international human rights norms, if there 
happens to be a conflict. Through CEDAW, among other main legal 
documents, “the human rights process seeks to replace cultural practices that 
are discriminatory with other cultural practices rooted in modern ideas of 
gender equality […] This effort sometimes demonizes culture as it seeks to 
save individuals from its oppressive effects.”59 The main issue with cultural 
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relativism is the denial of individual rights granted to members of a, e.g., 
religious community.60 Contrasting cultural relativism is Western 
essentialism.  
 
2.3.2.2 Western essentialism 
Because international human rights are based on Western ideas, cultural 
relativists conclude that international norms should not be used in any other 
culture than the Western.61 This also means that international human rights 
are not actually universal, but Western. Interestingly enough, both the 
cultural relativists and the feminist scholars seemingly view each other’s 
standpoints as “based on individualistic and particular moral philosophies 
which serve to exclude the perspectives of ‘others’ [and] founded on liberal 
notions of the self and on liberal prioritization of civil and political rights”62. 
However, a critical aspect of comparing the two views of critique can be 
said to be that the feminist critique approaches the entireness of human 
rights, challenging the spheres of private and public, whereas the cultural 
critique focuses on the “private sphere” of international law were it 
considers women’s rights still to be found.63 
 
2.3.2.3 Case law  
Because the discussion on culture and human rights can become abstract, a 
few legal cases might concretize this issue.  
2.3.2.3.1 Lovelace v. Canada  
Lovelace v. Canada64 is the case of the native Canadian woman Sandra 
Lovelace, who after marrying a non-member of her tribe, the Maliseet 
Indian tribe, no longer had the right to live on her former reservation. After 
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divorcing her husband, Sandra wished to move back. Because she had 
married outside of the tribe, she was considered by the group to have lost 
her tribe identity. If she had been a man, this would not have been the case. 
The Human Rights Committee reached the decision that this breached 
Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
ICCPR, which states that “persons belonging to (ethnic, religious or 
linguistic) minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the 
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and 
practise their own religion, or to use their own language”, since Lovelace 
was still part of such a minority. However, it supported the former 
community of Sandra in its cultural determination of her social identity, 
based on her marriage.  
2.3.2.3.2 Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum 
In this case65, Shah Bano Begum who was an Indian Muslim woman who 
divorced her husband from forty years, wanted to claim the Indian Code of 
Criminal Procedure maintenance payments as opposed to the lower ones 
derived from Muslim personal status law. Although the Supreme Court of 
India supported her claim, the government was later persuaded to reverse 
the decision after protests from the conservative Muslim community, with 
an act called “Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986”. 
Not only was Shah Bano Begum disadvantaged because she was a woman 
of a minority group, but also because she wished to go against that minority 
community.66 
 
2.3.2.4 Islamic particularism?  
The culturally motivated resistance to the promotion of women’s rights is, 
as has been established, sometimes religious, e.g. Saudi Arabia’s 
reservations to CEDAW. The surrounding objections to these reservations, 
as well as the appointment to the CSW, is also based on a general 
understanding that resistance based on religion does not easily yield. The 
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issue with Saudi Arabia’s discrimination of women is both cultural and 
religious, if any real distinction between the two can even be made. 
However, in defending its discriminatory legislation and customs Saudi 
Arabia does point to its commitment to Islamic law. When Western 
universalists condemn gender oppression in other regions, e.g. the Middle 
East, it is seen by cultural relativists as reflecting “an insensitive, 
ethnocentric approach to rights issues, which is linked to cultural 
imperialism”67. In 1986, some state parties to CEDAW expressed concern to 
the UN Secretary-General about reservations made to CEDAW on Islamic 
grounds and requested a survey, which after criticism from Muslim states 
did not happen.68 In the clash of women’s rights and culture, in this case 
culture consisting of religious legal traditions, the UN tolerated the latter at 
the expense of the former. All the while, Article 5 (a) of CEDAW points out 
that State Parties shall take all appropriate measures “to modify the social 
and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to 
achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other 
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of 
either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women”.  
 Islamists have suggested that the whole idea of universality of 
rights is a Western invention in order for the West to exercise its cultural 
imperialism onto Muslim countries.69 Ignoring the fact that not many 
decades ago there was significant Western cultural and religious resistance 
towards feminism, and partly still is today, enables cultural relativists to 
believe the Western culture, simply by nature, to be able of change.70 This is 
in stark contrast with the correlating view on non-Western, Muslim cultures, 
which cultural relativists “presume are frozen in time somewhere in the 
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darkness of the Middle Ages”, which in itself goes against the character of 
aspiration within international human rights law.71  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
The history of women’s rights has been one of marginalization and a need 
of constant re-enforcement of the fact that women’s rights are human rights. 
Women’s need of protection against discrimination due to patriarchal 
structures of society, was for a long time misinterpreted as women needing 
to be treated as a sub-group to men. The general notion is now that gender 
discrimination is battled most effectively if they are all presumed to have the 
same rights in the position of being humans. Agreeing women’s rights are 
human rights, the issue of the universality of these rights is still left open to 
conflict with cultural relativism and Islamic particularism, seeing as to how 
poorly CEDAW has been ratified. The actual promotion to really implement 
women’s rights still faces many barriers, not least challenges related to over-
arching global conflicts of the West and the non-West, secularism and 
religion and different legal traditions and political positions in the UN.   
                                                 
71 Mayer 1995, p. 183. 
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3 The Commission on the 
Status of Women  
This chapter goes more into detail of the main women’s rights body of the 
world, with a brief historic overview followed by its mandate and ending 
with its current situation and ambitions for the future, in order to answer the 
question concerning the international impact of the appointment of Saudi 
Arabia to the CSW 2018-2022.  
 
3.1 Brief history of the CSW 
The UN Charter Article 1 (2) sets out the purposes of the UN to be 
developing “friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples”, and Article 1 
(3) goes on to talk about the promotion and encouragement of respect for 
human rights without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.  
Article 55 goes on to point out the principle of equal rights and (c) the 
promotion of universal respect for human rights without distinction as to the 
discrimination grounds mentioned above. In order to implement these 
purposes of the UN, ECOSOC created the UN Commission on Human 
Rights in 1946. Its mandate included to prevent discrimination on the basis 
of sex. As a subsidiary organ to the Commission on Human Rights, the Sub-
Commission on the Status of Women was established by ECOSOC in its 
second session, also in 1946.72 This way of organising by the UN, to 
separate women’s rights from human rights, has been accused of “allowing” 
women’s rights to be treated as “lesser” rights by the mainstream human 
rights bodies.73 
                                                 
72 ECOSOC Resolution 11(II) (21 July 1946). 
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3.1.1 Early years of the CSW 
The Sub-Commission on the Status of Women was created to give the 
Commission on Human Rights “special advice on problems relating to the 
status of women”. In 1947, in its second session, the Sub-Commission on 
the Status of Women requested to be a functional commission on its own, 
reporting to ECOSOC.74 That same year the membership number was 
moved up from nine to fifteen. In early 21st century it would be 45. The 
CSW is a political body. The members are appointed by their governments. 
They are then to be elected to four-year terms by ECOSOC. As with the 
Committee, there is a set distribution geographically as to achieve 
representation from across the globe. As opposed to the Committee, 
members are not independent experts but representatives of the 
governments. Also with these members, they have mostly been women.  
 
3.1.2 1975-1985: “Women’s Decade”  
During the early 1970s the CSW shifted focus from the traditional rights-
based, to put more focus on women’s participation on the economic and 
social level, as well as targeting peace and self-determination, focusing 
more on developing countries.75 In 1975, the UN Decade for Women 
launched at the First World Conference on Women, held in Mexico. Two 
decades later, these both approaches would be combined in the BDPfA.76   
 
3.1.3 Beijing follow-up 
After the 1995 Beijing World Conference on Women, the commitments 
made were to be followed up by the CSW over five-year periods.  
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3.1.3.1 Beijing+5 
At the 23rd special session77 of the General Assembly in 2000, “Women 
2000: gender equality, development and peace for the twenty-first century”, 
that also was the scene of the Beijing+5 review, the CSW on the Status of 
Women acted as a the Ad-hoc Preparatory Committee. The session gave 
states the opportunity to share experiences and consider obstacles in the 
implementation of BDPfA. This review showed remaining problems. As a 
response a resolution was made on Further Actions and Initiatives to 
Implement the Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action78. Member States 
agreed to “assess regularly further implementation of the Beijing Platform 
for Action with a view to bringing together all parties involved in 2005 to 
assess progress and consider new initiatives, as appropriate, ten years after 
the adoption of the Beijing Platform for Action”. 
 
3.1.3.2 Ten-year review  
In 2005, the CSW had the ten-year review at its 49th session, and members 
recommitted to the BDPfA. Member States again agreed to work towards 
further implementation. The review by the Commission was focused on 
domestic implementation and what of the areas of the BDPfa were most 
urgent to look to.  
 
3.1.3.3 Fifteen-year review 
The fifteen-year review took place in 2010 at the 54th session79 of the CSW. 
Again Member States shares experiences and committed to overcome 
remaining obstacles.  
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3.2 Aims, mandate and functions   
Being a political body of the UN, consisting of as many as 45 member states 
at a time, the work of the CSW is characterized by political delicacy and 
subtle change over long periods of time.  
 
3.2.1 Aims of the CSW 
The ultimate goal of the CSW is naturally to achieve gender equality in the 
field of human rights, including all fields of society; political, economical, 
social and educational rights. In 1947, at its first session, the CSW declared 
Guideline Principles in order to achieve results in its work for women’s 
rights. It stated the ambition to elevate the status of women without 
distinction as to “nationality, race, language, or religion to equality to men 
in all fields of human enterprise; and to eliminate all discrimination against 
women in statutory law, legal maxims or rules or in interpretations of 
customary law.”80  
 
3.2.2 Mandate of the CSW  
 In 1987, ECOSOC decided to expand the mandate of the CSW “to include 
the functions of promoting the objectives of equality, development and 
peace, monitoring the implementation of measures for the advancement of 
women, and reviewing and appraising progress made at the national, 
subregional, regional, sectoral and global levels”81.  
 After Beijing in 1995, the UN General Assembly mandated the 
CSW, as mentioned above, to make follow-up reviews of the Beijing 
Conference. The CSW is not authorized to take any action or empowered to 
focus on the situation in a particular country or to undertake an 
investigation.  
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 The mandate of CSW as a political body made up of a wide 
range of member states is limited to influential power of promoting 
women’s rights politically and legally, in the soft law making way that is 
human rights law.  
 
3.2.3 Functions of the CSW  
Means of achieving the aims of the CSW include to create treaties, studies, 
organising seminars, making recommendations to ECOSOC, and being the 
main organisation to follow up the UN World Conferences on Women.  
 
3.2.3.1 Legal functions 
An important function of the CSW is the initiative to treaties. The CSW 
drafted the Convention on the Political Rights of Women (1952), the 
Convention on the Nationality of Married Women (1957) and the 
Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage, and 
Registration of Marriages (1962), all three having having lead to changes in 
domestic law, although lacking any enforcement mechanism.82 In the 
creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and the two 
covenants, ICESCR and ICCPR, in 1966, members of the CSW contributed 
to the Commission on Human Rights, the former HRC, including equal 
rights provisions.83   
 
3.2.3.2 Communication process 
There is a confidential complaint procedure in order to identify global 
patterns in women’s rights. This was established following a number of 
resolutions of the ECOSOC.84 Complaints are sent to the Commission’s 
Secretariat from individuals and organisations, to be summarised and sent to 
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the concerned Governments for comment. A working group of five CSW 
members from all five geographical regions then meets in closed session at 
each yearly session of the CSW. Its function is to consider communications, 
along with any government replies to these communications, and then bring 
to the CSW’s attention those communications that "appear to reveal a 
consistent pattern of reliably attested injustice and discriminatory practices 
against women". After this, the Working Group prepares a report for the 
CSW that "will indicate the categories in which communications are most 
frequently submitted to the Commission". The CSW will consider the report 
in a closed meeting and report to ECOSOC along with recommendations for 
action by the Council on the "emerging trends and patterns of 
communications".  
 
3.3 The current status of the CSW  
The election of Saudi Arabia to the CSW is a recent event, the effects of 
which are still to be discovered in the future. This is an overview of the 
CSW of today and the context in which it finds itself. The historic, and 
current, marginalization of women’s rights within the field of human rights 
is also reflected in its economic position within the UN. Joelle Tanguy, 
director of the Strategic Partnership Division of UN Women since last year, 
has a clear economic perspective on women’s rights.  
  
3.3.1 UN Women and Joelle Tanguy 
The UN General Assembly created UN Women in 2010 as the United 
Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, 
serving as the Secretariat of the Commission on the Status of Women. As of 
September 2016, Joelle Tanguy is the director of the strategic partnerships 
division of UN Women. Previously she has been the Under-Secretary-
General at the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Federation, 
Managing Director at the GAVI Alliance and Executive Director of Doctors 
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Without Borders. UN Women has said, “Saudi Arabia’s interest in 
occupying one of the Commission’s seats allocated to the Asia Pacific 
region is an indication that the country wants to play an active role in the 
work of this important body”.85  
 
3.3.1.1 Economic focus  
At GAVIA Tanguy was the engineer behind the first major refinancing 
effort, enabling the immunisation of more than 250 million children against 
lethal diseases and preventing more than 4 million premature deaths. She 
has a strong focus towards reaching equality goals by economical means. At 
the founding of UN Women, the annual budget goal was set at $500 million. 
Joelle Tanguy said in an interview in March 2017 that “[t]he goal is to make 
this the century of gender equality.”, however core and noncore funding 
together reached a little more than $300 million.86 She went on to speak of 
the importance of mobilizing all UN agencies in the promotion of gender 
equality. In a speech later on in March 2017, Tanguy addressed the issue of 
women’s rights in Saudi Arabia.87 She pointed out that women’s rights are 
not seen, as they were 20 years ago, through the lens of human rights. 
Today, the world understands the importance of economic empowerment of 
women to achieve successful business as well as development. Focusing on 
the economics of women’s rights, Tanguy provided the audience with 
statistic evidence of women’s gender equality as a money generating 
phenomena. She went on to speak of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development. 
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3.3.1.2 The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development   
In September 2015, more than 150 world leaders met at a historic UN 
Sustainable Development Summit and adopted a resolution of the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development, containing 17 Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs).88 These goals came into force on 1 January 
2016. Ranging from issues of poverty and climate change to inequality etc., 
these goals call for action by every member state regardless of financial 
means., while lacking any legal binding force. Governments are expected to 
initiate achievement of the goals and to hold the main responsibility for 
follow-up and review of the implementation progress. Number 5 of these 
goals is gender equality, however all goals “have key indicators related to 
women and girls as their full engagement is a condition to successful 
economic and social development.”89  
 
3.3.1.2.1 The Saudi Vision 2030 
The Saudi Vision 203090 mentions the word “women” 6 times in its 84 
pages long document. It states that Saudi Arabia is committed to “building a 
better country, fulfilling our dream of prosperity and unlocking the talent, 
potential, and dedication of our young men and women”. It goes on with 
ambitions of “investing in education and training so that our young men and 
women are equipped for the jobs of the future”. It also states that the Saudi 
economy “will provide opportunities for everyone - men and women, young 
and old - so they may contribute to the best of their abilities”. The Saudi 
Vision 2030 further affirms that “Saudi women are [a] great asset” and that 
the aim is to “increase women’s participation in the workforce from 22% to 
30%”. This involves expecting companies “to observe their social 
responsibilities and contribute to creating a sustainable economy, including 
by creating the stimulating opportunities for young men and women that can 
help them build their professional careers”. It is pointed out that Saudi 
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women constitute half of the country’s university graduates and pledges to 
“continue to develop their talents, invest in their productive capabilities and 
enable them to strengthen their future and contribute to the development of 
our society and economy”.91  
 In light of the background of the CSW, the current focus of 
UN Women and Saudi Arabia’s take on the Vision 2030, next is an 
overview of the events surrounding ECOSOC’s election of new members to 
the CSW for 2018-2022.  
 
3.4 The appointment of Saudi Arabia 
The theme of the sixty-first session of CSW, taking place 13-24 March 
2017, was “Women’s Economic Empowerment in the Changing World of 
Work”. In April 2017, the UN ECOSOC elected Saudi Arabia to the CSW 
by secret ballot.92 The four-year term begins at the first meeting of the 
Commission’s sixty-third session in 2018 and ends at the close of the sixty-
sixth session in 2022. The other twelve states elected are Algeria, Comoros, 
Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Iraq, Japan, Republic of Korea, Turkmenistan, 
Ecuador, Haiti and Nicaragua. In the group of Asian and Pacific states, there 
were five vacancies and five nominees, meaning there was no competition. 
If, however, any nominee receives less than a majority of votes among the 
54 members of the ECOSOC, the nominee can be rejected. The United 
States insisted on a vote.93 Out of ECOSOC’s 54 member states, 47 voted in 
favour of Saudi Arabia. While this was enough, it was also the lowest score 
among the elected states, no other receiving less than 52 votes. There being 
only seven states in total having abstained from voting, at least three of the 
ten EU countries that are currently members of ECOSOC voted in favour of 
Saudi Arabia. These countries are Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
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France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
Norway is also a current member of the ECOSOC. Belgian Prime Minister 
Charles Michel issued a statement of “regret” for having voted in favour of 
Saudi Arabia and said: “If we could redo it, the government would have 
advocated that there is no support (for Saudi Arabia), there is no ambiguity 
about that. I gave instructions so that in the future the political assessment of 
this type of file takes place at the highest level”.94 Commenting on this, 
executive director of UN Watch Hillel Neuer said: “Human rights activists 
everywhere ought to accept this rare apology, provided that it is matched 
with a real commitment to ending the UN’s routine elevation of gross 
human rights abusers to influential human rights bodies, which only 
empowers the regimes, not the victims.”95 Neuer also strongly insinuated 
that the appointment of Saudi Arabia was money-motivated due to the 
country’s oil wealth, giving it great political powers. He has also pointed to 
the secret agreements between Saudi Arabia and Russia, and Saudi Arabia 
and the UK, concerning its place on the Human Rights Council.  
 Looking at the other twelve countries elected to the CSW at 
the same time as Saudi Arabia it is obvious that the idea that states first must 
have reached a certain level of human rights in their country before being 
granted membership to human rights bodies is faulty. However, there is a 
difference between being able to grant limited human rights to women due 
to poverty and a lack of possibilities to develop a society, and choosing to 
deny women their rights despite the financial and development means being 
in place. The outrage over the appointment of Saudi Arabia might lie in a 
frustration due to the fact a country that is so rich and modern, with every 
economic possibility to stop discriminating towards women, nonetheless 
chooses to only to continue but to be possibly worse than any other country. 
This view insinuates that other countries where women lack the legal rights 
of men are at least trying their best, despite being poor and “unevolved”, 
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and therefore cannot be blamed for still being in the overwhelming chains of 
religion and culture. Undeniably, this uncovers the idea that what keeps 
non-Western states to reach the level of sophistication of Western states, is 
money, development and modernisation. This reasoning is in line with the 
proven view that culture exists only with “the others”. Saudi Arabia 
fascinates and frustrates the West in that it is wealthy and modern but still 
refuses simply to let go of their “Muslim” discrimination against women 
and become a fully worthy Westernized state.  
 Considering the collective disapproval and outrage of many 
countries to the reservations made upon Saudi Arabia’s ratification of 
CEDAW, it is peculiar that out of the seven of those countries, that were 
members of ECOSOC at the time of the vote, at least three did in fact vote 
in favour of Saudi Arabia. Those objecting and at the same time possibly in 
favour-voting countries are France, Germany, Ireland, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden and the UK.  
 
3.5 Conclusion  
The CSW is an interesting and complex political body of the UN, 
representing the highest protection of women’s rights available in the world. 
However, both its mandate and the influence of its separate member states 
are limited. At the time of the election of Saudi Arabia, the consensus 
among the media and human rights organizations was that this was a 
disrespectful betrayal towards women everywhere and to women in Saudi 
Arabia in particular. The conflict of the worst patriarchy of the world and 
the main women’s rights protector of the world was undeniable, and the 
reactions showed the views on the UN are both it being a meaningless farce 
and at the same time being important and influential enough to destroy 
something significant by the inclusion of Saudi Arabia.  
 Next chapter is a case study on Saudi Arabia, with the 
necessary information enabling a better understanding of what the impact of 
the appointment might be.  
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4 Saudi Arabia case study  
Saudi Arabia is infamous for restricting women’s lives with referral to 
Islamic law. In the Basic Law of Governance, the Saudi Constitution 
adopted in 1992, the first article states that the constitution of the kingdom 
is made up of the Holy Qur’an and traditions (the Sunnah) and that the 
Saudi legal system is based on Shari’ah. Therefore, in order to understand 
Saudi Arabia, this case study will begin with an overview of Shari’ah and 
the close historic relationship between Saudi Arabia and its religion, 
followed by the economic and cultural aspects of today. Saudi Arabia is a 
country with fascinating historical, social, religious, cultural, legal and 
political aspects and, due to the scope of this paper, this is an overview of 
the most important aspects.  
 
4.1 Shari’ah  
Considering Saudi Arabia made a reservation to CEDAW based on Islamic 
law it is necessary to have a basic understanding of Shari’ah and its place in 
Saudi Arabia, in order to appreciate this country’s relationship to religion 
and women’s rights.  
 
4.1.1 Brief history of Shari’ah   
Shari’ah means “a way to the watering-place or a path apparently to seek 
felicity and salvation” which means it is a path to religion, mentioned once 
in the Qur’an.96 A major concern of Shari’ah is the one of justice, and 
specifically of protecting the five values of life, religion, property, intellect 
and family. Sources of Shari’ah are the Qur’an and the Sunnah.97 Because 
Shari’ah is part of Islam, the concept of justice is part of believers’ faith as 
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 44 
well as of the regulatory justice.98 Islamic jurisprudence is called fiqh and is 
the only legal standard of Saudi Arabia, whereas almost all other Muslim 
states base their commercial and criminal codes on French, British and 
Russian law.99 The particular direction of Islam practised in Saudi Arabia is 
Wahhabism, which dates back to the very founding of the country.  
 
4.1.1.1 Wahhabism and the origion of Saudi Arabia 
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792) was the founder of 
Wahhabism, a reformation of Islam, aimed to purify the religion.100 The 
initial means to achieve this were through propaganda, the destruction of 
holy places and tombstones, and the murder of a woman.101 Her stoning, for 
the crime of “fornication”, spurred on the existing opposition towards 
Wahhabism, and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was sent into exile. Muhammad ibn 
Saud, the local emir of al-Dir’iyya where Ibn Abd al-Wahhab settled, along 
with his wife and two brothers, were supporters of Wahhabism.102 The two 
formed an alliance of military and religious support, and Ibn Add al-
Wahhab stayed in al-Dir’iyya after Ibn Saud had agreed to lift the tax on the 
people living there. Not only had this been against Shari’ah, but its removal 
also won the support of Ibn Saud among the people. In 1774, the Oath of 
Dhiriyya was made between these two men and cemented by marriages 
between the families that continue to this day.103 This was the start of the 
Islamic legitimation for the House of Saud.104 Their combined rule, as one 
religious and one political leader, ended in 1819 when al-Dir’iyya was 
invaded by the Ottoman Empire.105 Although the majority of the Saudi 
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population are not Wahhabi today, this part of Islam holds the monopoly on 
the kingdom’s religious life and controls the legal and educational 
institutions, supported by the monarchy.106 
 
4.1.1.1.1 Women in Wahhabism  
As for the Wahhabi view on women, the thoughts of imam Abdul-Aziz bin 
Baz (1910-1999) are still relevant to today’s Wahhabis.107 According to 
him, the fact that one woman cannot act as witness in court is due to the 
weak memory of women, his fatwa against women driving issued to prevent 
“depravity”, and his fatwa on obligatory full body covering because it is, 
simply, “obligatory upon women”.108 General mixing of the sexes, in fact 
women at all leaving the house, was banned through another fatwa by bin 
Baz, along with the prohibition of females teaching male children as that 
suggestion according to him was “inspired by Satan”.109 
 
4.1.2 Human rights in Islam 
Islam, being a religion, generally focuses more on the collective and human 
relations and justice concerning these relations and the good of the family, 
rather than on the specific rights of individuals.110 Overall, where Western 
jurisprudence speaks of rights, Islamic law speaks of rights and obligations, 
but with a wording focusing on obligations which has led to conclusions in 
the Orientalist discourse that Islam in fact provides no rights.111 There is, 
however, the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights.  
 
4.1.2.1 Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights 
Article 26 of the Basic Ordinance of Governance states that human rights 
are protected by the state in accordance with Shari’ah. In 1981, under the 
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support from the private London-based organisation the Islamic Council, 
connected to the Muslim World League with headquarter in Saudi Arabia, 
representatives from a number of countries, including Saudi Arabia, 
prepared the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, UIDHR.112 It 
differs from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the way it is 
formulated concerning men and women.113 As opposed to clearly stating 
equality between men and women, it leaves out the rights of women in a 
very subtle way, e.g. the English version of Article 19.a reads as “[e]very 
person is entitled to marry, to found a family, and to bring up children in 
conformity with his religion, tradition and culture.” The words “person” and 
“his” shows a reluctance to a clear statement of gender equality within the 
UIDHR. The article goes on to say that “[e]very spouse is entitled to such 
rights and privileges and carries such obligations as are stipulated by the 
Law.” The rights are not said to be equal, but to conform with “the Law”, 
i.e. Shari’ah.114 The UIDHR lacks any provision for the rights of unmarried 
women, or of men, what so ever. This should indicate the creators of the 
UIDHR wanting to highlight the fact that women are not to be without male 
supervision at any point in life, as well as not wanting to highlight all the 
rights of men that indirectly lead to human rights violations towards their 
wives, e.g. domestic violence and marital rape.115 
 
4.1.3 Religion or culture? 
Because Shari’ah is not only part of Islam but also of the legal structure of 
Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia, a differentiation between its 
religious and cultural character is not easily made. Cultural sensitivity 
within the context of human rights might have to mean religious sensitivity 
in relation to states that use Shari’ah, since there perhaps is no real 
difference between religion and culture. This is difficult to understand to 
most Western and secular jurists, because in our societies the distinction 
                                                 
112 Mayer 2013, p. 30.  
113 Ibid, p. 107. 
114 Ibid, p. 108.  
115 Ibid, p. 110. 
 47 
between what is legal and what is private is somewhat stricter, and because 
religion is portrayed as a matter of the heart and the very intimate aspects of 
being an individual – not something to so strongly colour an entire society. 
However, not speculating as to what extent Western and non-Western 
people respectively relate to their religious lives, the laws of Christianity 
have been intertwined with European legal systems and standards from so 
long ago that they make up “natural” parts of Western society rather than 
still constituting a separate web of rules. Therefore, religious values are 
inevitably part of the Western legal traditions as well, meaning Western 
religious culture has influenced the existing women’s rights of the UN. 
However, international women’s rights are secular in character.  
 
4.1.3.1 Secularism  
The separation of church and state is historically a European and Christian 
concept, leading to the general view of secularism as difficult to implement 
outside of that particular geographic and religious context.116 As opposed to 
the secularist view of the role of religion being weakened with the course of 
time, the influence of Islam has actually grown stronger over the last 
century.117 In the scenario that Shari’ah will not be abolished in favour of 
secularism and thereby enable the full applicability of international human 
rights treaties, the option left to secure human rights within states with 
Islamic law is to find the human rights protection within that law.118  
 
4.2 The Saudi state 
In 1932, Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd al-Rahman Al Saud, more commonly referred 
to as Ibn Saud, declared the region of Arabia the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
after 30 years of military struggles starting with the capture of Riyadh in 
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1902.119 What follows is a brief overview of the key points in recent history 
and of modern day Saudi Arabia. 
 
4.2.1 The oil  
Since economic aspects are evidently important in relation to the 
improvement of women’s rights, it is of course interesting to mention the 
extraordinary source of Saudi Arabia’s wealth, which is oil. Saudi Arabia 
began its exploitation of oil in 1938 and the increasing revenues from oil 
enabled the reinforcement of the Saud family’s authority and the 
establishment of a state bureaucracy during the 1950s.120 Since the 1970s, 
oil revenues have provided 70-90 % of the governments revenues.121 The oil 
crisis and the price of oil going down in the 1980s greatly decreased Saudi 
Arabia’s oil revenues, and following the Gulf War (1990-1991) and its 
consequence of economic costs to the Saudi state lead to a petition for 
political reform.122 Journalist, businessmen and academics asked for e.g. 
equality, extended freedom of press and improved lives of women.  
 
4.2.1.1 Oil money and women’s rights 
On 6 November 1990, a group of forty women protested the existing 
convention against women driving, by driving in a convoy through the 
streets of Riyadh (after which the government prohibited female 
demonstrations).123 As a response, the government turned the prohibition 
against female driving into a law completely forbidding it. Over the 
following two decades, the population of Saudi Arabia increased by more 
than 50 %, straining the economy.124 Economics would continue to be an 
issue for Saudi Arabia as this rich nation moved into today’s perspective of 
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having to move away from the dependence on oil, and money become a 
clear incitement to loosen the restrictions on women’s lives.  
 
4.2.2 Modern day Saudi Arabia  
As opposed to nearly all other Muslim countries, Saudi Arabia was never 
colonized by the West, which means Western law has never, throughout 
history, reached into the core of the legal system of Saudi Arabia.125 
Following 9/11, efforts increased among Saudis towards petitions calling for 
reforms of the government in order to promote democracy and human 
rights.126 However, the resistance of the Saudi state to yield to such 
propositions were to be overwhelmingly demonstrated through the shutting 
down of demonstrations and protests in 2011 during the Arab Spring. The 
royal family Al Sa’ud constitutes the state, and its partner in ruling for 250 
years, the Ahl Al-Shaykh, who are descendants of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, are 
not possible to distinguish from religious, educational and legal 
institutions.127 Wahhabi militia terrorizes both public and private spaces in 
Saudi Arabia under the title “The League for the Encouragement of Virtue 
and Prevention of Vice”.128 The Saud extended family from the time of their 
founder is numerous, with an estimate of ten thousand males, all holding 
government stipends.129 Above describes the context in which to look at the 
situation of Saudi women.  
 
4.3 Women in Saudi Arabia   
The women of Saudi Arabia face many difficulties that are presumably 
impossible for anyone else fully to comprehend. This is an as accurate 
overview of Saudi women’s legal situation as possible considering.  
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4.3.1 The male guardianship system  
The main issue with gender rights in Saudi Arabia is the male guardianship 
system.130 It is based on “the most restrictive interpretation of an ambiguous 
Quranic verse”, challenged by Saudi professors as well as religious 
scholars.131 Saudi women are not considered of legal age, as men are, since 
they through their entire lives are obligated to have a male legal guardian. 
Although not prescribed by law, this is accepted throughout society.132 It 
limits women’s legal capacity and powers concerning marital status, 
inheritance, property ownership, child custody and the choice of education, 
employment and where to live. This is, because of all the legal implications 
it brings with it, the gravest human rights violation affecting women in 
Saudi Arabia. Women are unable to move around in society, choose whom 
to marry, enrol to education, attend certain public events or travel without 
the validation of their guardian. There are even men who take advantage of 
their given authority over the dependant in question by extorting money 
from her by allowing her to work, travel etc. only if she pays the guardian 
money.133  
 Saudi Arabia, with the guardianship system in place, does not 
recognize women’s full legal capacity. Although a woman as of 2013 can 
obtain a national ID card without the consent of her guardian, and from 
2014 no longer needs a male relative to verify her identity in the interaction 
with the courts, realisation of female legal capacity is still haltering. It was 
only in 2001 that women could have personal ID cards at all.134 Before that, 
women were simply registered under the family card of their guardian. 
Today, women face difficulties both applying for the ID cards and appearing 
in court without their guardians. Proving her identity can be difficult 
without access to the family card, or her passport, which are held by the 
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guardian. In addition, ID cards naturally require bare faces, meaning 
guardians who do not approve of this, indirectly can forbid the picture being 
taken and court officers may deny women’s access to courts if they do not 
want to see their uncovered ID cards.135 They may also demand women to 
bring a male relative, even though the Ministry of Justice announced in 
2015 that disciplinary actions will be taken against court officials who fails 
to comply with the 2014 decision.136 
 The existence of the guardianship system, whatever specific 
improvements the government makes towards women’s rights, is what 
keeps Saudi Arabia in breach of CEDAW Article 15 (2), obligating states to 
“accord to women, in civil matters, a legal capacity identical to that of men 
and the same opportunities to exercise that opportunity”. While pressing the 
importance of progress, celebrating each improvement and every step 
towards gender equality, a woman interviewed by the Human Rights Watch 
said, “I don’t believe we can change this in small steps. It is what is 
happening right now. We need a very brave call from the government to 
remove this [guardianship] and make it equal.”137  
 Even though there are no legal barriers for women to vote or 
run for elections, the male guardianship system create practical obstacles for 
women in terms of proving they live in their voting district, since their 
names normally are not listed along with the men’s in the paperwork.138 
Women can also be required to present the family card, which is often kept 
by the guardian, even though women are now able to have their own ID 
cards. By a decree issued by the government in 2016, council meetings have 
to be gender segregated, and so female councillors can only participate via 
video link.139 
 As long as women cannot travel abroad or study abroad 
without permission, women cannot take advantage of the possibilities that 
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education should create. As long as there is no penalty for employers who 
require guardian permission for women to work, despite the government not 
requiring it, and the government requiring employers to separate men and 
women in the workplace which creates an obstacle for the employer, women 
cannot fully enjoy the employment freedoms set out on paper. Other 
significant as well as symbolic changes has however been made only over 
the second half of 2017.  
 
4.3.2 The lift of the driving ban 
On 26 September 2017, Saudi Arabia announced that King Salman had 
issued a royal decree ordering to reform the ban on women driving.140 From 
June 2018, women will be able to drive in Saudi Arabia. A woman who 
wants a driving license can have one without the permission of her guardian 
and she does not need to bring the guardian in the car when driving. Causing 
a medial stir all over the world, many congratulating Saudi Arabia to this 
historical milestone, it also rose questions about the intentions behind the 
removal of the ban. According to Alwaleed bin Talal, an influential Saudi 
prince and women’s rights advocate, the average Saudi family spends 
$1,000 every month on private drivers and taxis due to the fact that women 
are not allowed to drive (and public transport not being an alternative).141 
Last year he also tweeted “Stop the debate: Time for women to drive”.142 
Whatever the reasons, women being allowed to drive is undeniably a step in 
the right direction for women’s rights in Saudi Arabia.  
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4.3.3 Concerts, sports events and cinemas 
At the 87th anniversary of the foundation of Saudi Arabia, celebrations with 
various concerts and performances at the King Fahd International Stadium 
in Riyadh on 23 September this year were, for the first time ever, accessible 
to women.143 While concerts have generally been limited in Saudi Arabia 
due to morality laws on clothing and gender segregation, music events are 
part of the social reform of Vision 2030. By-passing the gender segregation 
issue in order to enable women to enjoy music events, Saudi Arabia had its 
first concert open only to women on 29 November this year.144 Naturally, 
the singer also was female. On 14 December, however, a concert with an 
American hip hop artist was held open to men only, which sparked 
annoyance from women wanting to attend as well as from conservatives 
criticizing it because of the questionable morality of the performer’s past.145 
 From early 2018, women will have permission to attend three 
of the country’s largest and most important sports stadiums.146 Cinemas will 
also be returning to Saudi Arabia next year and be open to both genders, 
after having been completely banned since early 1980s when the Saudi state 
made legislation stricter as a reaction to the Islamic revolution in 1979.147   
 
4.4 Commitments of Saudi Arabia  
All Middle Eastern states have made reforms in order to improve the status 
of women, apart from Saudi Arabia.148 Having, however incompletely, 
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ratified CEDAW, Saudi Arabia is obligated to issue state reports on the 
measures taken towards the promotion of women’s rights.  
 
4.4.1 CEDAW report 2008 
The latest CEDAW State Reports issued by Saudi Arabia and which has 
been translated from Arabic is the Combined initial and second periodic 
reports149, examined at the CEDAW 40th Session, held at the United Nations 
Office at Geneva in 2008. There is also the combined third and fourth report 
issued in 2016, unfortunately to my knowledge only available in Arabic. 
The report from 2008 begins with explaining that there are certain 
fundamental features that sets Saudi Arabia apart from other countries. 
Apart from its central geographical position, occupying ca 80 % of the 
Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia is described as “the cradle of the Islamic 
message and the direction to which all Muslims throughout the world turn in 
prayer, due to the fact that God created His Sacred House (the Kaaba) at 
Makkah al-Mukarrama and the Mosque of the Prophet at Madinah al-
Munawwara”. It goes on to say that Saudi Arabia has adopted the Holy 
Koran as its constitution. As to the legislative framework, the Combined 
initial and second periodic reports states that all laws and regulations derive 
from the Holy Koran and the Sunna of Muhammad, which contain 
“unequivocal rulings in favour of non-discrimination between men and 
women, desiring that women enjoy the same rights and duties on a basis of 
equality”. It also refers to the Basic Law of Governance, the royal decree 
issued by King Fahd in 1992, and claims that Article 26, that stipulates state 
protection of human rights in accordance with Shari’ah, prohibits 
discrimination against women. The report goes on to point out that the Saudi 
state always has “devoted attention to the social and economic aspects of the 
family in general and of women in particular, in the belief that women have 
a special role to play in the destiny of peoples and that no nation can have a 
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radiant future without the conscious involvement of mothers”. Commenting 
on the ratification of CEDAW, the report states that there generally is no 
discrimination against women in the laws of the Kingdom, but that CEDAW 
is taken into consideration in the framing of new laws and in the amendment 
of existing laws.  
 
4.4.1.1 Measures taken by Saudi Arabia  
According to the reports, the most important measures the Saudi state has 
taken since CEDAW came into effect is, among many, a change in the 
traditional view of women in society by an increased awareness of women’s 
role in the country’s development. In addition, primary education has been 
made compulsory for both genders between the ages of six and 15, and there 
has been an increase in employment opportunities for women and the 
establishment of a higher national committee specialized in women’s affairs.  
 
4.4.1.2 Response from the Committee 
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
commented150 on the combined initial and second periodic report of Saudi 
Arabia at its 815th and 816th meetings on 17 January 2008. It particularly 
congratulated Saudi Arabia on the higher national committee specialized in 
women’s affairs and the process of drafting new legislation on the 
implementation of women’s rights. The Committee then went on to express 
its concern about the general reservation made upon ratification, due to its 
width making it contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention, 
urging Saudi Arabia to consider withdrawal, since the Saudi delegation 
assured the Committee there is no substantial contradiction between the 
Convention and Islamic Shari’ah. It also expressed concern that, although 
the Convention is part of domestic law, there is a lack of awareness of the 
Convention. The Committee also called Saudi Arabia to understand the 
principle of equality as equal rights between men and women, rather than 
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similar rights and complementarities. It urged Saudi Arabia immediately to 
abolish the practice of male guardianship. As to the promotion of women’s 
rights in accordance with BDPfA and Beijing+5, the Committee encouraged 
Saudi Arabia to develop a national action plan with a strategy. Furthermore, 
the Committee encouraged Saudi Arabia to take measures to increase the 
number of women participating in elected decision-making bodies and to 
ensure equal access to all fields of education and on all levels, since the 
Committee pointed out the rate of illiterate women, indicating 
discrimination within the education system. The Committee requested, for 
the next report, more data and analysis on the situation of Saudi women and 
the impact results of measures taken when implementing CEDAW. Also, 
the Committee encouraged Saudi Arabia to ratify the Optional Protocol, 
which has not happened as of November 2017.  
 
4.4.2 CEDAW report 2016  
The combined reports from 2016 have not been translated into English on 
the website of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
OHCHR, and it is not included at all on the list of States Latest Reports on 
the UN website.151 This is therefore, with apologies in advance for any 
essential errors, my own translation from Arabic to English of Saudi 
Arabia’s combined third and fourth reports to the Committee.  
 The report mentions the Vision 2030 for Saudi Arabia and “the 
empowerment of women, the promotion of participation in political and 
public life, freedom of association and support, and the right to participate 
in cultural and recreational activities”. In order to achieve “the ambitious 
goals of Vision 2030 Saudi Arabia” a decision was issued.152 Also, interim 
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targets to year 2020 has a special strategy linked to it. The first phase of the 
initiatives to achieve these goals and objectives was launched in 2016, to be 
followed by annual stages. The strategy includes recognizing challenges and 
evaluating performance in order to build efficiency and sustainability in the 
work of the government, by using innovative methods and national follow-
ups. Again, it was pointed out that Saudi Arabia’s Shari’ah based systems 
use the principle of complementary gender equality, rather than simply plain 
equality. This takes into account the characteristics of both men and women, 
whilst achieving justice in the end. The report goes on to say that “many 
legislative and other measures have been taken to empower women and to 
promote and protect their rights”. One important aspect is that women have 
the right to vote and run for office on equal terms with men. It goes on to 
say that the Ninth National Development Plan 2009-2014 has resulted in the 
achievement of a number of goals for women, such as the empowerment of 
women to participate in achieving development goals, enhancing its status 
and influence in the family and society, addressing the phenomenon of 
domestic violence, developing women’s contribution to economic activity, 
making quantitative and qualitative progress in the education of Saudi girls 
and working towards eliminating female illiteracy. The 10th Development 
Plan includes goals such as developing support services and facilities to 
enable women to fulfil their economic and social role, increasing 
employment opportunities, achieving more targeted care to improve 
women’s health and providing women with excellent access to 
administrative provisions in government agencies and universities. The aim 
is to raise the level of household economies by activating the productive 
role of women and with the help of entrepreneurs “overcome traditional 
handicaps”. Furthermore, the report states that awareness of the importance 
of the protection of women is spread within the word of Islam, pointing to 
the texts that express the rights of women must be not only protected but 
also respected and honoured. This takes into account the limits of the male 
guardianship and the full compatibility between the Islamic law and the 
human nature. As to the upbringing of the family, achieving the best 
interests of the child is, according to the report, to achieve justice. 
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Addressing the male guardianship system, the report points out that it is 
viewed by the Committee and other human rights mechanisms and 
organizations to be a derogation from women’s rights. However, they go on, 
male guardianship in fact represent principles that promote human rights in 
general. The male guardianship means that men are required to take care of 
the needs of women, including spending money on them. In no way, it goes 
on, does it imply or construe any domination or exclusion by men over 
women. The abuse of the male guardianship, to control women or violate 
their rights, remains in the context of individual wrong doings.  
 There are no statutory provisions that prevent women from 
voting or running for election. Women have been included to the Shura 
Council, the highest advisory body of the king. (30 women were appointed 
to it in 2013 by then-king Abdullah.153 In 2015, for the first time in the 
history of Saudi Arabia, women were allowed to participate in municipal 
council elections, marking an important victory.154) Saudi Arabia's systems 
allow Saudi women to represent their government at the regional and 
international levels through their work. The number of Saudi women 
working in diplomatic posts 81 was diplomatic in 2014, while there were no 
female diplomats in 2008. The number of female enrolments in postgraduate 
programs and training programs in 2014 was 108, in 2008 the number was 
34. The number of female enrolments in education generally has also gone 
up since the last issued report. The report notes that the educational system 
is based on equality between men and women, but has put more attention 
towards women in order to increase female enrolment and success by 
aiming to eliminating means of discrimination. The progress in education 
has contributed to a higher rate of women in the labor force. However, the 
results are not as good as Saudi Arabia had hoped, with a much higher rate 
of unemployment among women than among men.  
 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia reaffirmed that Islamic Shari'ah 
is the main reference to personalized personal issues, which organize the 
relationship within the family, concluding the combined reports.  
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 The economic incitements to improve women’s right to work 
in Saudi Arabia should however be significant, since women represent only 
around 20 % of the country’s work force despite earning half of higher 
education.155 Despite falling short of the preferred standards of women’s 
rights, Saudi Arabia has achieved important changes. The individual behind 
the most recent social reforms is Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman.   
 
4.5 Mohammed bin Salman 
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, son of King Salman, was the one 
who unveiled the Saudi Vision 2030 plans in 2016. While royal decrees can 
only be issued by the King, bin Salman has been working towards the social 
reforms of concerts and cinemas over the second half of 2017. He has great 
ambitions to reform Saudi Arabia economically and socially, saying: “What 
happened in the last 30 years is not Saudi Arabia”156.  
 
4.6 Conclusion  
Saudi Arabia has undeniably made changes over the last decade to improve 
women’s rights. However, as long as the male guardianship system is in 
place, the effects of these reforms are deterred or blocked.157 Saudi Arabia is 
a complex and secretive country, with strong international political powers 
due to its oil generated wealth. It is difficult so say to what extent women’s 
rights promoting changes are being made with the intention to improve the 
lives of Saudi women, to improve the rest of the world’s idea of Saudi 
Arabia or to improve the economy. What can be established, however, is 
that improvements indeed have been made since the election to the CSW, 
and that there might be a correlation between them and the appointment.  
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5 Analysis  
Above chapters together provide the combined information on the separate 
issues of women’s rights, the CSW, culture, religion and Saudi Arabia, in 
order for this analysis to answer the research questions set out in the 
beginning of this paper. This analysis chapter will be evaluating this 
combined information and aim to make well-founded speculations. 
Considering the research questions of this paper reach into the future, in 
asking what impact the Saudi Arabia appointment might have over the next 
four years on the CSW and on the lives of Saudi women in both a near and 
far perspective, this analysis cannot provide any clear answers. It instead 
consists of the conclusions that, in my opinion, are possible to draw from 
the information at hand.  
 
5.1 International impact  
On the international level, the impact of the appointment of Saudi Arabia 
could affect the CSW, its members and by extension the outcome of the 
work of the CSW, i.e. international law concerning women’s rights.  
 
5.1.1 The CSW  
Apart from the important function of creating international law concerning 
women’s rights, the work of the CSW has no direct effect exceeding a 
symbolic impact and the setting of political standards of women’s rights. 
CEDAW ratifications weighed down by reservations of the type Saudi 
Arabia made, reflect the flexible and tolerant attitude towards women’s 
rights and the low status it still has globally and in the context of human 
rights.  
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 Prior to the mandate period of 2018-2022, it is of course 
impossible to say how the state will use its place on the CSW. The influence 
of member states is limited to yearly contributing to determine the agreed 
conclusions from CSW sessions and to vote on possible resolutions from the 
yearly session. However, it is an undeniable fact that Saudi Arabia is an 
economically robust state with strong political connections to the West. 
While the dependency on oil will have to decrease, it is still a significant 
power factor of Saudi Arabia, upholding its strong position in the world.
 What should be expected from the UN and of the CSW over 
these next four years is to put an increased pressure onto the Saudi state to 
honour their commitment to CEDAW and to earn their place on the CSW, 
in order to lessen the burdens of Saudi women under the guardianship 
system. 
 
5.1.1.1 Other member states 
As well as questioning Saudi Arabia’s seat on the HRC based on the 
controversial influence of “petrol dollars”, it is reasonable to do the same 
with this newfound position on the CSW. As long as this remarkably 
wealthy country remains a main oil exporter, the risk of other member states 
being affected due to financial reasons cannot be disregarded. There might 
be a risk of Saudi Arabia affecting other member states towards slowing 
down CSW’s work towards promoting women’s rights, possibly by holding 
the same position as towards CEDAW and the Optional Protocol, i.e. 
clinging to old Islamic norms covered up by culture as a poor defence of 
gender discrimination.  
 States are members of the CSW to learn, educate and elaborate 
on women’s rights issues. Many countries with lacking rights of women are 
not as well equipped as a wealthy state such as Saudi Arabia to work 
towards such improvement other than slowly and steadily. In countries 
where e.g. education for all children is still a luxury of the future, structures 
of discrimination girls and restricting women to remain at home with the 
family are not as surprising. These countries, lacking economic resources 
and real political powers, probably also lack the power to influence other 
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member states of the CSW negatively in the sense of spreading their low 
standard of women’s rights. The case of Saudi Arabia is, however, unique.  
 The world is indeed dependent on oil and there is a risk that 
over these upcoming years Saudi Arabia will be on the CSW, other 
members of the CSW will adapt their voting in order to keep their economic 
relationships to Saudi Arabia intact.  
 
5.1.1.2 Economics   
One major focus of the UN Women as of today is the economic 
empowerment of women. The fact a nation where as many of society’s 
adults viable for work as possible are actually working will experience 
economic growth has been well established.  
 Last year’s Saudi Vision 2030, put forward by Crown Prince 
Mohammad bin Salman who is also behind recent social reforms, contains a 
central goal of maintaining the strong Saudi economy in the future. This will 
inevitably mean improving women’s rights by enabling their studying, 
working and moving about in society. With its population growing and oil 
prices going down, Saudi Arabia will eventually have to grant to women 
their basic human rights, meaning it might have less reason to stifle the 
CSW process promoting women’s rights. The economic focus of the CSW 
together with the undeniable fact Saudi oil is not a self-renewing pot of 
wealth which urges Saudi Arabia to find new ways of promoting the 
economy, areas where gender discrimination hinders economic growth will 
most likely eventually be lessened or completely eliminated. Due to strong 
religious and traditional forces and the obligations of Shari’ah, this will, 
however, take time.  
 The population of Saudi Arabia, grown custom to a tax-free 
society because of their rich nation, will not likely settle for a lower standard 
of life. As social life develops, and strengthens the economy, the absurdity 
of keeping women indoors and out of society will most likely become 
increasingly more obvious to all Saudis. The need for economic growth will 
eventually make the government of Saudi Arabia find ways to accommodate 
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the idea of universal international standards of women’s rights within the 
context of their cultural complexity.  
 
5.1.1.3 Women’s global rights  
Having a seat on the CSW over the next four years will probably mean 
heightened attention on Saudi Arabia in all issues concerning women’s 
rights. The fact that Saudi Arabia was elected to the CSW while still relating 
to CEDAW with the same reservations due to Islamic law, insinuates that 
states can pick and choose from such an important treaty and still be able to 
ratify it. This is in spite of the overwhelming grounds to object as well as 
the fact that so many states did just that.  
 Women’s rights are still at constant risk of being ridiculed and 
marginalized within international law. The fact that both CEDAW 
ratifications and its reservations are so many, cements the idea that women’s 
rights are at the mercy of the good intent of states. When these states are 
extreme patriarchies, the UN will seemingly accept anything they can get, 
even if that means seriously challenging the very foundation of treaty law as 
a whole. To commit to improving women’s rights through a legal document 
created from secular law, while keeping the right to deny women those 
rights if they come into conflict with religious law, should not be possible.  
 If the confusion as to human rights, religion and culture would 
have been clearer to the CSW, and to the field of international law in 
general, the UN would perhaps have been less forgiving and less flexible in 
dealing with resistance to commitment to promoting women’s rights. The 
foundation of the legality of human rights are that they need to be universal, 
because if they are not they are not actually human but something else, 
perhaps male rights or Western secular women’s rights. No cultural 
sensitivity should be permitted to relativize women’s rights, since that goes 
against the very core of the idea of human rights. However, in the 
realization of women’s rights there is no room for any kind of idealism if 
the “wrong” way in fact does lead to the “right” things happening.  
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5.2 Domestic impact  
The second research question of this paper is what the impact of the 
appointment of Saudi Arabia will be on the domestic level, i.e. on women in 
Saudi Arabia.  
 
5.2.1 Saudi Arabia’s women 
In attempting to answer this, the following is an evaluation partly of the 
main obstacles of Saudi women’s rights and partly of the political and 
economic incitements of the Saudi government’s likeliness to improve 
Saudi women’s rights.  
 
5.2.1.1 Cultural relativism 
The discussion on the conflict between the universal promotion of 
international women’s rights and the importance of cultural sensitivity will 
most likely not reach any final solution in the near future. Neither is 
“culture” easily defined. In the case of Saudi Arabia, its history and culture 
is not separable to its religion of Islam. The entire foundation of the Saudi 
state is intertwined with the Muslim faith, and more particularly the 
orthodox direction of Wahhabism, to the extent that modern Saudi Arabia is 
inseparable to the strict legal and social norms derived therefrom. This of 
course means that any secular point of view regarding the rights of women 
in non-secular settings is not appropriate. However, Saudi delegations has 
affirmed there is no contradiction between Shari’ah and women’s rights. 
What is hindering Saudi women from enjoying their full human rights under 
CEDAW is therefore not Islam or Shari’ah per se. The male guardianship 
system, while not being prescribed by religion, is so strongly embedded in 
the Saudi society that the removal of it can seem as difficult to achieve as if 
it had indeed been from religion. Whether this custom should be described 
as being part of Saudi tradition, as a rest from the patriarchal structures of 
history, or as part of Saudi culture, it cannot be said to simply be derived 
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from the fact Saudi Arabia is a Muslim country. That exotifying way of 
generalising this “non-Western” religion, to grant it greater powers than it in 
itself can possibly contain, is threatening to distract from the specific 
responsibilities of Saudi Arabia. While the world is outraged over the way 
Saudi women are treated as second class citizens, cultural relativism perhaps 
made it possible for Saudi Arabia to ratify CEDAW in spite of obviously 
being in breach of Article 15, and to be appointed to the CSW despite 
completely consciously remaining a notorious women’s rights violator. 
However traditionally bound the systematic gender discrimination in Saudi 
Arabia might be, the resistance towards abolishing harmful traditions cannot 
be explained neither by religion nor by tradition. If anything, the social 
norms created by the Saud family, and by extension the Saudi government, 
that protect the existence of traditions harmful to women, e.g. the male 
guardianship system, might possibly unfold to be part of Saudi culture. In 
any case, cultural relativism must not slow down the process towards 
abolishing the male guardianship system. If Saudi Arabia is on a long 
overdue yet serious path towards liberating women so that they can enjoy 
their full rights, the male guardianship system needs to be removed before 
access to work and education and the right to the freedom of movement can 
be fully realized. There is reason to believe, due to strong economic 
incitements and in spite of strong conservative forces, that by the end of the 
term of 2018-2022 Saudi Arabia will be closer to abolishing the male 
guardianship system than it is today. In the context of religion, culture and 
traditions it is however difficult to speculate as to the future due to the 
dignity and importance of these aspects to the lives of those concerned.  
 
5.2.1.2 Economic incitements   
The positive changes that have been made by Saudi Arabia recently towards 
the improvement of Saudi women’s rights are likely, to a great extent, 
motivated by the prospect of economic growth. These social reforms have 
also been putting positive global attention on Saudi Arabia. Considering 
earlier efforts of Saudi women to further change have been met by even 
stricter legislation, the desire in itself of the female Saudi population to be 
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granted their full human rights will not be enough to achieve profound 
change. The conservative Saudi forces are seemingly very strong. However, 
the previous tendency of Saudi Arabia to favour social reforms in times of 
need of economic growth, real change can indeed be expected to be made in 
the near future. The fact Saudi Arabia eventually needs to become less 
dependent on oil will most likely be impossible to disregard by the rich and 
powerful, however traditional and resistant to change. There might be 
backlashes to these efforts of Mohammad bin Salman to modernize and 
boost the economy, as there have been before. The politics of a state made 
up of the same people that constitute the royal family, is naturally very 
complex. There are conservative forces as well as modernisers, as with most 
countries.  
 Again, what is undeniably certain is that the full human rights 
of Saudi women cannot be realized prior to the male guardianship system 
having been abolished. Whether the appointment of Saudi Arabia to the 
CSW will eventually enable that to happen, is difficult to say, however there 
is reason to believe it is at least not less likely than had Saudi Arabia not 
been elected to the CSW. As Joelle Tanguy and the UN Women has put a 
strong focus on the economic participation of women in society as a mean 
of improving women’s rights, future improvements of the legal possibilities 
of Saudi women will be made from the perspective of economic growth. 
 However, lifting bans that have been discriminating women 
does not necessarily mean the social, religious and cultural barriers will be 
removed as easily. Women of Saudi Arabia actually participating in society 
on the same terms as men and being able to make decisions about education 
and employment is essential for the laws to be efficient. Young women not 
being able to plan their lives as to what and where to study, nullifies any 
increase of the number of girls in schools. Divorced women changing their 
guardian from their elderly fathers to their young sons, barely of legal age, 
is of course nothing but humiliating. Along with the male guardianship 
system, gender separatism is the main barrier to gender equality, threatening 
to stifle women’s access to the new social life of Saudi Arabia.  
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6 Conclusion 
At the beginning of this process, I set out to try to broaden the perspective 
on the appointment of Saudi Arabia to the CSW. Instead of simply stating 
the controversy and making grim predictions to the future, I hoped to be 
able to provide a bigger picture. In doing so, I wanted to underline the fact 
that however controversial the appointment might be, there are no sure 
answers to the questions of how it will affect the CSW or women’s rights in 
general, and Saudi women’s rights in particular. I have, to the best of my 
ability, tried to gather the necessary knowledge, present it in an 
understandable way and evaluate it in order to draw somewhat logical 
conclusions. Because the topic is new, I have done so without reference to 
any similar work, however, I hope to have included as well as excluded 
appropriate aspects of these complicated issues. My take away, having 
finished this paper, is that however unyielding the forces of history, there is 
no telling what the powers of change can do for the future of women’s 
rights. Social change seems, however, dependant on economic incitements.  
 Working on this paper has meant aiming to look at both sides 
of the story with every aspect of the issue. The discussion on human rights, 
and perhaps particularly the human rights of women, can easily turn into a 
sense of “one” disciplining “the other”. For international women’s rights to 
achieve real universality, it needs to include women living under religious 
as well as secular norms. For international women’s rights to remain 
protective of all these women, however, it needs to resist ill attempts at 
culturally relativizing the rights of certain women to the extent they are in 
fact excluded. International law sometimes seems, simultaneously, robust 
but fragile, influential but pointless. The notion of women’s rights will, 
however universal the legal frameworks expect them to be, exist within the 
context of the history, religion, culture and politics of every specific region 
of the world.  
 The CSW will keep working with states in its flexible fashion. 
Saudi Arabia is changing. The lack of freedom and human rights for women 
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in Saudi Arabia stems from a complex history of religious conflicts and the 
creation of a state where there is no real distinction between the royals and 
the government. However controversial the appointment of Saudi Arabia to 
the CSW might be, I do believe the possible improvements of the rights of 
Saudi women will outweigh any risk of undermining the work of the CSW 
as a whole. The appointment should not be viewed as a reward, because that 
would obviously have been undeserved and constitute a provocation of 
Saudi women living their oppressed lives under the Saudi government. It 
should instead be considered a chance to achieve real change, to commit 
fully to the realization of women’s human rights.  
 I recently spoke to the friend of a friend who has a female 
relative living in Saudi Arabia. Regarding the appointment, she had said 
most women will not dare to take advantage of the absence of the driving 
ban out of fear of social repercussions. Hopefully the fact that Saudi Arabia 
will have been on the CSW for half a year at the time for women being 
allowed to drive, will mean the political pressure on Saudi Arabia to follow 
up legal changes in practice will at least be stronger than had Saudi Arabia 
not been appointed.  
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